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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 One of the more anomalous structural features of the corporate 
income tax is the dividends received deduction,1 which permits a cor-
poration to deduct from income an amount equal to some or all of the 
dividends it receives in its capacity as a shareholder of another do-
mestic corporation. At first glance, the provision seems to be justified 
by the general sentiment against taxing corporate income more than 
twice. If this is the explanation, however, the dividends received de-
duction is underinclusive because some intercorporate dividends are 
only partially deductible. As currently drafted, the amount of the de-
duction is based on the degree of a shareholder’s control. Dividends 
are completely (100%) exempt if a corporate shareholder owns at 
least 80% of the distributing corporation,2 80% exempt if the owner-
ship interest is less than 80% but at least 20%, and 70% exempt if 
the ownership interest is less than 20%.3 If avoiding triple (or more) 
taxation was the rationale, it is not clear why all intercorporate divi-
dends would not be completely exempt from further taxation. Given 
partial deductibility and the importance of degree of control, it is 
therefore natural to conclude that the dividends received deduction is 
less about a concern over multiple layers of taxation and more about 
substance-over-form concerns. In other words, it is about differentiat-
ing true dividends from distributions that are really just shifts in 
money from a corporation’s right pocket to its left pocket. If that is 
the explanation, however, the dividends received deduction is overin-
clusive because it applies to very small investments in another corpo-
ration where the distribution really does move money from one tax-
 ∗ Paul Hastings Professor of Business Law, UCLA School of Law. Thanks to Joe 
Bankman, Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Jim Hines, Sheldon Pollack, Clarissa Potter, Chris Sanchiri-
co, Dan Shaviro, Larry Zelenak, and participants at the FSU Law Review Symposium 
commemorating the centennial of the federal income tax and the National Tax Associa-
tion’s annual meeting for their helpful comments.   
 1. I.R.C. § 243. 
 2. See id. §§ 243(a)(3), (b), 1504(a)(2).  
 3. Id. § 243(a)(1), (c). 
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payer to an entirely different taxpayer. Thus, a corporation that owns 
a single share of stock in a large public corporation still can exclude 
70% of the dividend from income.   
 The incoherence of the current tax treatment of intercorporate 
dividends is a product of its historical development. As described by 
the few commentators who have examined the history of intercorpo-
rate dividends taxation to any extent, its origins can be traced back 
to the New Deal.4 In the Revenue Act of 1935,5 corporate income was 
for the first time subject to graduated marginal rates. In announcing 
the progressive rate scheme, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
noted that to prevent the evasion of the new graduated rates through 
the use of subsidiaries, each of which had income below the thresh-
olds for the application of the higher rates, it would be necessary to 
impose a tax on intercorporate dividends. Intercorporate dividends 
went from being fully exempt to being only 90% exempt. In theory, 
this change was designed to discourage any attempts to evade the 
new graduated system. In reality, however, the additional effective 
tax burden was too small to be a significant deterrent in most cases 
given the alternative of having a corporation’s income subject to the 
top corporate rates.   
 The underlying rationale for taxing intercorporate dividends was 
more about discouraging the formation and continued existence of 
certain large corporate groups, or “pyramids,” than it was about clos-
ing a loophole in the graduated rate scheme. The name for these con-
troversial corporate structures derived from their multilevel corpo-
rate chains of ownership in which the investors at the top of the pyr-
amid were able to leverage a relatively small investment in one cor-
poration in order to exercise power and influence over a large group 
of subsidiaries at the bottom of the pyramid. As economist Randall 
Morck observed, this pyramidal structure was “believed to facilitate 
governance problems, tax avoidance, market power, and dangerously 
concentrated political influence.”6 Although the resulting tax burden 
from the introduction of intercorporate dividend taxation was too 
small to force an immediate change in organizational structures,7 it 
 4. See, e.g., David R. Francis, The Taxation of Intercorporate Dividends: Current 
Problems and Proposed Reforms, 64 TAXES 427, 430 (1986); George Mundstock, Taxation of 
Intercorporate Dividends Under an Unintegrated Regime, 44 TAX L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1988); 
Daniel C. Schaffer, The Income Tax on Intercorporate Dividends, 33 TAX LAW. 161, 163 
(1979); Michael J. Maimone & G. Frank Riley III, Note, Taxation of Intercorporate Divi-
dends:  A Missed Opportunity for Tax Reform, 7 VA. TAX REV. 777, 779 (1988). 
 5. Revenue Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-407, 49 Stat. 1014. 
 6. Randall Morck, How to Eliminate Pyramidal Business Groups: The Double Taxa-
tion of Intercorporate Dividends and Other Incisive Uses of Tax Policy, 19 TAX POL’Y & 
ECON. 135, 136 (2005). 
 7. See Steven A. Bank & Brian R. Cheffins, The Corporate Pyramid Fable, 84 BUS. 
HIST. REV. 435, 443-45 (2010) (finding in a study of SEC filings between 1936 and 1938 of 
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was part of a multifaceted campaign against corporate pyramids that 
included changes in tax laws, securities laws, and the enactment of 
the Public Utility Holding Company Act.8 
 Not only was the intercorporate dividends tax primarily about this 
campaign against pyramids, it was tied as much—or more—to a prior 
move to repeal the consolidated return. Formerly a requirement for 
corporate groups to prevent evasion of the war profits and excess 
profits taxes,9 the consolidated return had become merely an option 
for affiliated corporations as of 1921. By 1932, however, growing con-
cern about the use of holding companies had led Congress to consider 
reforms to make such structures less desirable. Initially, corporate 
groups had to pay a penalty tax to file a consolidated return, and 
then in 1934, the privilege was revoked entirely for most corpora-
tions. A companion proposal to tax intercorporate dividends, howev-
er, was narrowly defeated. The continued existence of the full exemp-
tion for intercorporate dividends after 1934 appeared to be an end-
run around at least one aspect of the consolidated return repeal.      
In 1935 and 1936, Congress reduced the exemption for inter-
corporate dividends in order to bolster the concerted action against              
holding companies.  
 This original rationale for the taxation of intercorporate dividends 
soon became unnecessary. Starting in the 1940s, concern about py-
ramidal structures lessened as reorganization began to occur under 
the Public Utility Holding Company Act, which had also been enact-
ed in 1935. In 1942, the consolidated return privilege was revived, 
and all penalties were eliminated as of 1964. Consequently, Congress 
moved away from an intercorporate dividends tax and back toward 
the exemption concept that had existed prior to 1935.10 In the time 
since, however, the provision has neither returned to its roots nor 
fully embraced a scheme based on degree of control. In Part II, this 
Article examines the history of the tax treatment of intercorporate 
dividends, focusing on both the failed attempt to repeal the dividends 
received deduction in 1934 and then its reduction in 1935. Part III 
corporate shareholders owning more than 10% of the stock of another corporation that 
more than 80% of corporate shareholders remained unchanged, and of the corporate share-
holders that changed their holdings, the number of purchases of increased shares virtually 
matched the number of sales). 
 8. Id. at 439, 448; Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-333, 
49 Stat. 803.   
 9. See infra text accompanying notes 36-40. 
 10. The use of the word “exemption” is a reference to the effect rather than the means 
of accomplishing that end. The partial or full exclusion of intercorporate dividends has 
sometimes been accomplished through an exemption, sometimes through a credit, and 
more commonly through a dividends received deduction. There is no clear explanation for 
the difference, but one commentator has suggested that it was a difference in “nomencla-
ture only.” Mundstock, supra note 4, at 7 n.28.  
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describes the evolution of the dividends received deduction after the 
New Deal, taking special note of the changes in circumstances re-
garding the treatment of consolidated corporate groups. Finally, the 
Article concludes by discussing the possible future of the tax treat-
ment of intercorporate dividends and the proposals that have been 
raised for its reform. 
II.   ORIGINS 
A.   1909 
 The idea that a corporation could hold stock in another corpora-
tion was a relatively new phenomenon in America at the turn of the 
century. New Jersey was the first state to enact a statute broadly 
permitting corporate ownership of other corporations in 1889, and 
other states were slow to follow.11 Even as late as 1916, Professor 
Maurice Wormser reported in his corporate law treatise that “it is 
generally held in this country that a corporation has no power to sub-
scribe for or to purchase stock in another corporation, unless such 
power is expressly given in its charter or is reasonably implied in 
it.”12 Otherwise, a corporation could bypass any charter restrictions 
on its purpose by purchasing stock in a corporation undertaking an 
unauthorized line of business.13 Perhaps to get around such ultra vir-
es objections, investors created the holding company. Wormser noted:  
 In recent years there has come into existence a class of corpora-
tions known as holding companies. These corporations are orga-
nized exclusively for the purpose of acquiring and holding stock in 
other corporations. Their validity has been upheld in some states, 
including New York, but in others, notably Illinois, they have been 
condemned because of their tendency to create monopolies.14  
 Critics of excessive business consolidation during the first decade 
of the twentieth century were especially concerned about the devel-
opment of holding companies, which they viewed as an abusive stock 
 11. CHRISTOPHER GRANDY, NEW JERSEY AND THE FISCAL ORIGINS OF MODERN AMERI-
CAN CORPORATION LAW 42 (1993); CHARLES S. TIPPETTS & SHAW LIVERMORE, BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL: CORPORATIONS AND TRUSTS IN THE UNITED STATES 213 
(1932). Prior to affording general statutory authority, some states permitted corporate 
stockholding under special charters or in statutes targeted at specific industries. WM. L. 
CLARK, JR., HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 183 (I. Maurice Wormser 
ed., 3d ed. 1916). For example, in 1853 New York granted telegraph companies the authori-
ty to own stock in other telegraph companies as part of a program to facilitate interstate 
telegraph holding companies. RONALD E. SEAVOY, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BUSI-
NESS CORPORATION, 1784-1855, at 198-99 (1982). 
 12. CLARK, supra note 11, at 183. 
 13. JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE 
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970, at 45 (1970). 
 14. CLARK, supra note 11, at 185. 
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consolidation technique designed to evade the Sherman Antitrust 
Act.15 By 1912, the Democratic Party platform specifically proposed 
to limit the ability of states to permit holding companies and inter-
locking directorates. 16  After the election, William C. Redfield, the 
Secretary of Commerce in President Woodrow Wilson’s new admin-
istration, publicly stated that corporations should “not hold stock in 
the competing companies, and that neither a person nor a corpora-
tion shall at the same time own a controlling interest in two or more 
competing corporations.”17 Eventually, these statements led to a bill 
proposing to bar corporate acquisitions of stock in other corporations 
whenever “the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially less-
en competition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired 
and the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain such com-
merce . . . or to tend to create a monopoly.”18 The Clayton Act, as the 
bill was called after passage in 1914,19 was too ambiguously drafted 
to be viewed as a substantial impediment to holding companies, but 
it did reflect the prevailing sentiment against such structures in the 
pre-World War I era.20 
 This controversy over corporate holding companies was looming 
during the debates over the 1909 corporate excise tax—often consid-
ered the forerunner of the modern corporate income tax because the 
amount due was a function of the corporation’s income.21 The original 
bill introducing the excise tax included an exemption for dividends 
received from another corporation,22 but this was attacked as a de 
facto tax exemption for corporate holding companies. During deliber-
ations over the 1909 corporate excise tax, Insurgent Republican Sen-
ator Moses Clapp of Minnesota introduced a motion to repeal the ex-
emption of dividends paid by corporate subsidiaries to their parent 
 15. HARLAND PRECHEL, BIG BUSINESS AND THE STATE: HISTORICAL TRANSITIONS AND 
CORPORATE TRANSFORMATION, 1880S-1990S, at 66 (2000). As Lawrence Mitchell has writ-
ten, “[t]he trust structure was no longer a subterfuge. The holding company transformed it 
into a perfectly legal device.” LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY 31 
(2007). 
 16. PRECHEL, supra note 15, at 66.   
 17. Id. at 66-67 (citation omitted). 
 18. Id. at 68. 
 19. Id.; Clayton Act, Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914). 
 20. PRECHEL, supra note 15, at 68. 
 21. Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of Aug. 5, 1909, Pub. L. No. 61-5, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112. 
 22. In a carefully scripted exercise, the corporate excise tax was introduced in the 
Senate by Senate Finance Committee Chair Nelson Aldrich as an amendment to Senator 
Henry Cabot Lodge’s motion to substitute an inheritance tax for Democrat Joseph Bailey’s 
income tax bill. It was drafted by Senator Elihu Root and Attorney General George Wick-
ersham under the close supervision of the President, and it was “carefully scrutinized” by 
the Senate Finance Committee as part of a campaign by the President to make the bill 
more likely to pass through Congress. ROY G. BLAKEY & GLADYS C. BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL 
INCOME TAX 45-47 (1940).   
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holding companies.23 Clapp complained that the bill “permits the or-
ganization of holding companies and exempts such holding compa-
nies from any tax where their capital is invested in the stock of sub-
ordinate companies.” 24 Senator Nelson Aldrich, a Republican from 
Rhode Island, objected:  
No holding company or any other company is exempted . . . . This 
proposition simply, in the case of corporations which have paid the 
tax once and whose stock is held by another corporation, permits 
the second holding corporation or the corporation holding the stock 
to return an exemption on account of that first payment. In other 
words, it does not enforce double taxation upon these various cor-
porations. Every corporation must pay the tax, and if it is paid 
once, this act says in effect it shall not from necessity be paid a   
second time.25  
Anti-holding company legislators used the words of the bill’s spon-
sors, which had been carefully drawn to avoid constitutional scrutiny 
after the Supreme Court struck down an income tax in Pollock26 in 
response to such argument. New York Senator Elihu Root, one of the 
principal drafters of the corporate excise tax bill, had said earlier in 
the session that “it is not the profits that would be subject to the tax, 
but the privilege or facility of transacting the business through cor-
porate form.”27 Jonathan Dolliver, an Insurgent Republican from Io-
wa, recited that quote and went on to say:  
If, then, this is not an income tax, if it is not a tax on earnings, if it 
makes no difference where the money comes from that flows into 
the corporate treasury, on what theory are we, who sit here repre-
senting the American people, exempting from the burden of this 
tax not little corporations, because they can not afford to pay it, 
but great corporations, many of them grown so great that they 
trample under foot the laws of the United States, and have in some 
instances turned our Government itself into a farce through its 
impotency in dealing with their pretensions?28  
Clapp echoed Dolliver’s argument, noting that because this was an 
excise tax on the privilege of operating in corporate form, rather than 
a true income tax where double taxation might be a valid objection, 
“there can be no reason . . . why a great holding corporation, orga-
nized to buy a controlling interest in other corporations, should es-
 23. 44 CONG. REC. 3877 (1909). 
 24. Id. at 4228. 
 25. Id. at 4231. 
 26. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 635-37 (1895) (noting that the 
decision striking down the 1894 income tax as unconstitutional would not preclude impos-
ing an excise tax on the privilege of doing business). 
 27. 44 CONG. REC. 4230 (1909). 
 28. Id. 
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cape any taxation for the privilege or right of being a corporation and 
engaging in the business of operating and dominating other corpora-
tions.”29 After futile debate between Aldrich and several Insurgent 
Republicans over the issue, Aldrich announced he was going to accept 
the amendment in order to move on to the rest of the bill.30 Propo-
nents of Clapp’s proposal to tax intercorporate dividends suspected 
that Aldrich expected it “to be sacrificed in conference,” but Aldrich 
insisted he would carry forth the views of the majority.31 
 As it turns out, the Insurgent Republicans were right to be suspi-
cious of Aldrich’s motives because Clapp’s amendment was stricken 
during conference proceedings.32 When Representative Sereno Payne, 
a Standpatter Republican from the holding company-friendly state of 
New York, reported back to the House regarding the conference pro-
ceedings, he was asked why the exemption for intercorporate divi-
dends was reinserted.33 Payne responded that “[t]here is no reason in 
the world why a corporation that owns stock in another company 
should pay a double tax upon those holdings. It is not equitable, it is 
not right, and it ought not to be exacted. [Applause].”34 Payne noted:  
When it comes to the breaking up or absorption of a company in 
order to get rid of competition by another company, I will go to the 
full length in preventing it; but I am not in favor of using the tax-
ing power for that purpose, and, of course, a tax of 1 per cent would 
not accomplish any purpose in that respect.35  
Critics of the growing influence of holding companies assailed the 
result, declaring that “[t]his exemption of the giant concerns that 
draw enormous tribute from combinations of lesser companies is re-
garded by many as the most pernicious feature of the bill.”36 
B.   1913–1921 
 Notwithstanding the strong repudiation of intercorporate dividend 
taxation in 1909, the anti-holding company movement described ear-
lier may have ultimately gotten the upper hand because the exemp-
tion for intercorporate dividends was not imported from the corporate 
excise tax when the first post-Sixteenth Amendment income tax was 
adopted in 1913.37 Although unpopular among businesses, this was 
 29. Id. at 4228. 
 30. Id. at 4233. 
 31. Id. 
 32. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 22, at 49. 
 33. 44 CONG. REC. 4696 (1909). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Dividend Tax Now in Bill, LAFOLLETTE’S WKLY. MAG., July 31, 1909, at 14. 
 37. Revenue Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, § II, 38 Stat. 114, 116. 
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accepted in part because of the low stakes. As Columbia economist 
Edwin Seligman reported to the American Economic Association’s 
Committee on War Finances, “[t]his was possible, although unjustifi-
able, when the rate of the income tax was only 1 or 2 per cent.”38 
 Once the U.S. entered World War I, the stakes increased and the 
tax treatment of intercorporate dividends became more intolerable 
for many businesses. With the corporate income tax rate tripling 
from 2% in 1913 to 6% in 1917, coupled with a 1916 levy that im-
posed a tax of fifty cents per $1000 of capital stock outstanding, 
which disproportionately affected corporate groups, some holding 
companies even considered reorganizing to lessen their burden.39 In 
response, Congress in the War Revenue Act of 1917 adopted a tax 
credit for the receipt of intercorporate dividends.40 This credit was 
merely partial relief, however, because it only covered the 4% surtax 
imposed under the Revenue Act of 1917 passed earlier in the year, 
and it did not cover the 2% tax that had been adopted in the 1916 
Act. The Wall Street Journal noted that the intercorporate dividend 
tax credit, “commendable as it was, did not go far enough and result-
ed in much confusion.”41 In 1918, Congress went the final step and 
permitted corporate shareholders to deduct the full amount of       
intercorporate dividends from income.42 Seligman called it “simple        
justice,” with the deduction amounting to a complete exemption of      
the dividends.43 
 This Congressional focus on the tax treatment of intercorporate 
dividends was part of a broader review of the taxation of corporate 
groups. Originally, affiliated corporations were not permitted to file a 
single, consolidated tax return that combined the profits and losses of 
each member of the group.44 All corporations were taxed separately 
on their own profits and losses, regardless of their common owner-
ship and control. This may have disadvantaged some companies 
seeking to offset the gains of one member of the corporate group with 
the losses of another member, but as one businessman later noted, 
“[T]he rate of income tax on corporations was very slight, and it 
probably did not make very much difference one way or the other 
 38. Seligman Reports on War Finances, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1918, at 14. 
 39. See, e.g., New Taxation to Spur Corporate Reorganization, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 
1916, at 5 (describing an announcement by Distillers Securities Corporation that it 
planned to merge all of its subsidiaries into its parent company to reduce its capital stock 
burden). 
 40. War Revenue Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-50, § 4, 40 Stat. 300, 302. 
 41. Justice to Corporations Begins to Appear, WALL ST. J., May 14, 1918, at 10. 
 42. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 234(a)(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1078 (1919). 
 43. Seligman Reports on War Finances, supra note 38, at 14. 
 44. Walter A. Staub, Consolidated Returns, in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 188 (Robert 
Murray Haig ed., 1921). 
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whether there was a consolidated return or a series of returns for the 
members of one business family.”45   
 In 1917, the introduction of excess profits taxation made the sepa-
rate entity approach more advantageous for some corporate taxpay-
ers, at least with respect to the excess profits tax. Through intercom-
pany charges between affiliated corporations, such as management 
fees or the price paid for items supplied by one company to the other, 
a corporate group could manipulate its profits so as to avoid or great-
ly minimize its exposure to the excess profits tax. Initially, the 
Treasury issued regulations authorizing the Commissioner of Inter-
nal Revenue to require consolidated excess profits tax returns 
“[w]henever necessary to more equitably determine the invested capi-
tal or taxable income.”46 Congress followed up in the Revenue Act of 
1918 by requiring consolidated income tax and excess profits tax re-
turns for corporate groups in which at least 95% of the stock of each 
of the corporations within the group was owned by one or more of the 
other corporations in the group and a common parent corporation 
owned at least 95% of the stock of at least one member of the group.47 
This was apparently welcomed by the business community, since 
even under the Treasury Regulations “most corporations identified 
themselves as eligible for consolidated filing and filed the consolidat-
ed return, probably because the resulting consolidated return re-
duced their tax.”48 According to one report, 75% of all corporate tax 
collected in 1917 came from companies voluntarily filing consolidated 
returns.49 Thus, although the move to require consolidated returns 
 45. Revenue Revision, 1934: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 73rd 
Cong. 523 (1934) [hereinafter 1934 House Hearings] (statement of John G. Buchanan, 
Armstrong Cork Co.). 
 46. Regs. 41, Art. 78, T.D. 2694, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 294, 321 (1918). The authori-
ty for issuing this regulation was somewhat tenuous. One contemporary observer identified 
the authority as Section 201 of the Act of October 3, 1917, which provided: 
For the purpose of this title every corporation or partnership not exempt under 
the provisions of this section shall be deemed to be engaged in business, and all 
the trades and businesses in which it is engaged shall be treated as a single 
trade or business, and all its income from whatever source derived shall be 
deemed to be received from such trade or business. 
Staub, supra note 44, at 189.  
 47. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 240, 40 Stat. 1057, 1081-82 (1919). 
Although enacted in 1918, it was made retroactive to 1917. Edward H. Green, Aspects of 
the Problem of Income Taxation From the Standpoint of Corporations, 10 TAXES 441, 443-
44 (1932). 
 48. Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Consolidating Foreign Affiliates, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 143, 
172-73 (2011). Although the regulations were only meant to apply to certain groups of 
companies, the instructions to the excess profits tax return asked whether the return was a 
consolidated return, which Cummings speculates “may have indicated to taxpayers that 
filing a consolidated return was at their option.” Id. at 172. 
 49. Internal Revenue: Hearing on H.R. 8245 Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 67th Cong. 
133 (1921) (statement of Professor T.S. Adams). 
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was initially prompted by concerns of excess profits tax evasion, the 
push for consolidated returns more generally was ultimately linked 
with Congress’ move to exempt intercorporate dividends from tax to 
avoid the punishing effects of the high wartime surtax rates. When 
the excess profits tax was ended under the Revenue Act of 1921, 
Congress made consolidated returns optional rather than mandato-
ry,50 but the exemption for intercorporate dividends remained. 
C.   1921–1934 
 In 1927, dissatisfaction with the consolidated return led the Joint 
Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation to recommend discontinu-
ing consolidated returns. 51 Prompted by this recommendation, the 
House voted for the repeal of the privilege in 1928.52 These moves, 
however, were primarily based on administrative rather than sub-
stantive concerns. Moreover, the Treasury worried that abolishing 
consolidated returns “would be a practical impossibility in view of the 
complexity of modern corporate business, and endless confusion in 
corporation tax administration would result.”53 Ultimately, Congress 
rejected the repeal option and authorized the Treasury to issue     
new regulations to clarify the application and operation of the      
consolidated return.54   
 Consolidated returns had survived, but not for very long. In 1932, 
Congress once again considered the issue of the propriety of permit-
ting consolidated returns. In the House, Representative Clarence 
Cannon, a Democrat from Missouri, introduced an amendment to re-
peal the consolidated return privilege.55 Rather than simply being a 
reprise of the administrative concerns that had prompted a similar 
proposal in the late 1920s, however, this repeal proposal was animat-
ed by concern about the evils of affiliated corporate groups such as 
corporate pyramids.56  
 This focus on the evils of corporate pyramids and other affiliated 
organizational structures reflected a growing concern that these 
practices had played a central role during the 1920s in crowding out 
small competitors and concentrating wealth and power in the hands 
of a few.57 The principal feature of the pyramidal structure was that 
 50. Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No 67-98, §§ 240(a), 301, 42 Stat. 227, 260, 272. 
 51. Cummings, supra note 48, at 177-78. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Senate to Decide Fate of Tax Bill, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 1927, at 18. 
 54. Roy G. Blakey, The Revenue Act of 1928, 18 AM. ECON. REV. 429, 435-36 (1928); 
Robert N. Miller, The Taxation of Intercompany Income, 7 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 301, 
306 (1940). 
 55. See, e.g., 75 CONG. REC. 7124 (1932) (statement of Rep. Cannon). 
 56. See infra text accompanying notes 61-62. 
 57. See, e.g., FREDERICK LEWIS ALLEN, THE LORDS OF CREATION 248 (1935) (“[I]f it 
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the owners could use a small investment to exert control over a vast 
empire.58 In 1932, at the same time Congress was considering wheth-
er the use of consolidated returns was appropriate, Adolf Berle and 
Gardiner Means published their landmark work, The Modern Corpo-
ration and Private Property.59 In this work, they explained that “[t]he 
owner of a majority of the stock of the company at the apex of a pyr-
amid can have almost as complete control of the entire property as a 
sole owner even though his ownership interest is less than one per 
cent of the whole.”60 One prominent example of this was the Van 
Swearingen brothers, who accumulated control of railroad corpora-
tions throughout the 1920s via investments by their Allegheny Cor-
poration holding company.61 According to Berle and Means, “[b]y this 
pyramid an investment of less than twenty million dollars has been 
able to control eight Class I railroads having combined assets of over 
two billion dollars.”62 The presence of corporate pyramids was partic-
ularly pronounced in the public utility sector. One contemporary 
study of the period concluded that “[s]o great was the importance of 
pyramiding holding companies in the utilities industries in the dec-
ade from 1920 to 1930 that the terms ‘holding company’ and ‘public 
utility company’ became synonymous in the public mind.”63 
 In the presidential campaign of 1932, Roosevelt promised to seek 
“[r]egulation and control of holding companies by Federal [P]ower 
[C]ommission and the same publicity with regard to such holding 
companies as provided for the operating companies.”64 Roosevelt de-
clared that the failure of  
[t]he great Insull monstrosity, made up of a group of holding and 
investing companies and exercising control over hundreds of oper-
ating companies . . . has opened our eyes. It shows us that the de-
velopment of these financial monstrosities was such as to compel 
had not been for the lavish use of this logical extension of the holding-company device, 
many of the giants of the economic world would never have got their growth.”). 
 58. Investors at the top of the pyramid used a variety of means to maintain control, 
including cascading holdings of bare majority ownerships, thin capitalization (with funds 
provided by preferred stock and debt), and multiple classes of stock (some of which are non-
voting). See JAMES C. BONBRIGHT & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE HOLDING COMPANY: ITS 
PUBLIC SIGNIFICANCE AND ITS REGULATION 147-48 (1932); WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, MAIN 
STREET AND WALL STREET 317 (1927). 
 59. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRI-
VATE PROPERTY (1932). 
 60. Id. at 73. 
 61. See id. at 23; BONBRIGHT & MEANS, supra note 58, at 256, 259; RICHARD SAUN-
DERS, JR., MERGING LINES: AMERICAN RAILROADS 1900–1970, at 64 (2001). 
 62. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 59, at 73. 
 63. CHARLES S. TIPPETTS & SHAW LIVERMORE, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND PUBLIC 
CONTROL 184 (2d ed. 1941). 
 64. Text of Governor Roosevelt’s Speech at Portland, Oregon, on Public Utilities, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 22, 1932, at 16. 
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ultimate ruin, that practices had been indulged in that suggest the 
old days of railroad wild-catting, that private manipulation had 
outsmarted the slow-moving power of government.65   
 The concern was that the consolidated return helped facilitate an-
ticompetitive behavior by holding companies. According to Repre-
sentative Cannon, the consolidated return “penalizes David and as-
sists Goliath.”66 Cannon went on to note that the consolidated return  
is a favorite device of the utilities. An electric company or tele-
phone branch or transportation company pays little attention to 
the cost of installing new services. A railroad company can run a 
bus line at a loss, a streetcar company can operate a line of taxi-
cabs, or a power company can preempt a new community at a loss. 
Through the benevolent provisions of this law they charge these 
losses against their profits elsewhere and reduce their taxes while 
destroying competition and monopolizing the market.67 
 Contemporary observers called the question of whether to repeal 
or severely tax consolidated returns “[o]ne of the hardest fought con-
tests” during deliberations over the Revenue Act of 1932.68 Acknowl-
edging that “[t]he House is divided on this proposition,” Representa-
tive Charles Robert Crisp, a Democrat from Georgia, successfully 
persuaded his colleagues to adopt a compromise proposal to subject 
corporate groups to an additional 1.5% tax for the privilege of filing a 
consolidated return.69 At the urging of Andrew Mellon’s replacement, 
Treasury Secretary Ogden Mills, 70  the Senate Finance Committee 
removed the penalty tax in the bill it reported on the Senate floor,71 
but a compromise was reached in conference. Congress elected to 
subject corporate groups filing consolidated returns to an additional 
three-fourths of 1% tax for the privilege of filing such a return in 
1932 and 1933, and 1% in 1934 and 1935.72 Supporters of repeal con-
soled themselves by noting that a penalty provision would test 
whether supporters of consolidated returns were correct as to their 
benefits. As House Speaker John Nance Garner—an advocate for re-
peal in 1928 and reportedly the behind-the-scenes leader of the 1932 
 65. James A. Hagerty, Portland Cheers Speech: The Governor Cites ‘Insull Monstrosi-
ty’ as He Hits ‘Interests,’ N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1932, at 1. 
 66. 75 CONG. REC. 7125 (1932). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Roy. G. Blakey & Gladys C. Blakey, The Revenue Act of 1932, 22 AM. ECON. REV. 
620, 625 (1932). 
 69. 75 CONG. REC. 7126 (1932) (statement of Rep. Crisp). 
 70. Text of Secretary Mills’s Statement to Senate Finance Committee on Tax Bill, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 7, 1932, at 20. 
 71. Blakey & Blakey, supra note 68, at 631; House’s Rates Increased, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
28, 1932, at 1; Tax Bill Completed; Revised Throughout on Mills’s Pattern, N.Y. TIMES, May 
7, 1932, at 1. 
 72. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 22, at 345. 
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repeal effort73—noted, “[i]f it is advantageous to them to file such re-
turns they will pay the penalty. If there is no advantage in consoli-
dated and affiliated returns, they will submit separate returns.”74 
Thus, as part of a general increase in the corporate income tax rate 
from 12% to 13.75%, the rate for affiliated corporations filing a con-
solidated return was increased to 14.5% for 1932 and 1933.75  
 In 1933, the consolidated return issue was revisited. A subcom-
mittee of the Ways and Means Committee issued a report on the pre-
vention of tax avoidance in which it revived the earlier proposals of 
the Joint Committee on Taxation and the Ways and Means Commit-
tee to repeal the consolidated return.76 According to the report, the 
primary impetus for addressing the consolidated return was the re-
peal under the National Industrial Recovery Act of the ability to car-
ry forward net operating losses from one year to the next. The Sub-
committee noted:  
 In the past, when any corporation could carry forward a net 
loss from one year to another, the consolidated group did not have 
such a great advantage over the separate corporation. Now that 
this net-loss carry-over has been denied, the advantage of the con-
solidated return is much greater on a comparative basis.77  
 Commentators immediately assailed this recommendation as im-
prudent and unfairly penalizing most businesses for the abuses of a 
few. Godfrey Nelson of the New York Times noted that “[e]xisting law 
in respect of the filing of consolidated returns by affiliated corpora-
tions is amply justified on the ground of sound business practice and 
should be retained.”78 In hearings held before the House Ways and 
Means Committee in the aftermath of the subcommittee report,         
a representative from the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey     
testified that  
[t]here may be arbitrary allocations in consolidated groups to pro-
duce that result [of consistent loss offsets], but there are many 
other types of consolidations, natural vertical set-ups, as in our 
case, where there is every reason to have separate corporations for 
 73. Garner Will Take Floor Today to Lead Fight for Tax Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 
1932, at 1. In the debates over the 1928 Act, Garner also proposed a graduated corporate 
income tax rate scheme. Senate to Decide Fate of Tax Bill, supra note 53 (describing the 
graduated tax on corporations as “the brain-child” of Representative Garner). See Barbara 
Deckard Sinclair, Party Realignment and the Transformation of the Political Agenda: The 
House of Representatives, 1925-1938, 71 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 940, 943 (1977).  
 74. 75 CONG. REC. 7127 (1932). 
 75. Blakey & Blakey, supra note 68, at 622. 
 76. SUBCOMM. ON TAX REVISION, COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 73D CONG., PREVENTION 
OF TAX AVOIDANCE 10 (Comm. Print 1933). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Godfrey N. Nelson, Consolidated Tax Held as Sound Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 
1933, at N5. 
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certain operations . . . , and it is not a case of taxation, because 
they would continue to exist regardless of the tax penalty, and do 
exist regardless of any tax penalty.79  
Railroad representatives were particularly insistent that their busi-
ness model was necessary, in no small part because of state and fed-
eral limits on consolidation.80 Ben Dey, the general counsel of the 
Southern Pacific Co., a railroad company that both operated and 
owned the stock of sixty subsidiaries, urged  
that if the full committee approves the recommendation of the sub-
committee I say to you in all fairness and on behalf of these rail-
road systems in the United States, only five or six of whom are 
making their way or are not on the verge of bankruptcy, that you 
should make an exception with respect to the parent company       
if it is engaged in interstate commerce as a common carrier, that      
it may come in and make a consolidated return for itself and        
its subsidiaries.81  
Dey concluded that “it is impossible to put the railroads under this 
proposal without committing a terrific public crime. They simply 
cannot stand it.”82  
 Although the Ways and Means Committee ended up only propos-
ing an increased penalty tax for consolidated returns, repeal was 
again proposed in the Senate. Seeking to “strike at the holding com-
pany system,” Progressive Senator William Borah introduced 
amendments to deny corporate groups the right to file consolidated 
returns and to deny any deduction for intercorporate dividends.83 The 
proposal to repeal consolidated returns passed the Senate by a vote of 
forty to thirty-seven, albeit with an exception for railroad corpora-
tions, but the denial of the dividends received deduction was defeated 
by a vote of thirty-nine to thirty-three.84   
 The result was that the law was left in a bit of a muddle. Barring 
consolidated returns arguably did reduce one advantage of utilizing a 
holding company structure by denying a corporation the right to    
offset its gains from one subsidiary with the losses of another subsid-
iary. 85  By preserving the dividends received deduction, however,   
 79. 1934 House Hearings, supra note 45, at 518 (statement of M.E. McDowell, Stand-
ard Oil Co. of New Jersey).   
 80. See, e.g., id. at 503-04 (statement of Jacob Aronson of the New York Central Lines) 
(arguing that the 1920 Transportation Act limited the ability of railroads to consolidate all 
of their lines and operations in a single corporation). 
 81. Id. at 484 (statement of Ben C. Dey, General Counsel, Southern Pacific Co.). 
 82. Id. at 486. 
 83. Tax Bill Changes Offered by Borah, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1934, at 38. 
 84. See Estate Tax Levy Raised $92,000,000 by Senate, 65 to 14, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 
1934, at 1. 
 85. But see Godfrey N. Nelson, Corporations Hit by New Tax Policy, N.Y. TIMES, May 
6, 1934, at N9 (“Either because of misunderstanding or by reason of a superficial 
                                                                                                                                        
2013]  WHEN WE TAXED THE PYRAMIDS 53 
 
holding companies could still pass income through multiple tiers 
without recognizing additional layers of taxation. Moreover, for those 
seeking to attack the Van Swearingen-style corporate pyramid, an 
intercorporate dividends tax was far more likely to be important be-
cause of the absence of a 95% control requirement as that which ex-
isted for consolidated returns. The seeming inconsistency would soon 
be resolved. 
D.   1935–1936 
 On June 19, 1935, Roosevelt delivered a special Tax Message to 
Congress.86 Right from the start of his message, it became clear that 
his focus was less about revenue and more about using tax to remedy 
certain perceived economic ills. According to Roosevelt,  
if a government is to be prudent its taxes must produce ample rev-
enues without discouraging enterprise; and if it is to be just it 
must distribute the burden of taxes equitably. I do not believe that 
our present system of taxation completely meets this test. Our rev-
enue laws have operated in many ways to the unfair advantage of 
the few, and they have done little to prevent an unjust concentra-
tion of wealth and economic power.87  
After justifying a graduated corporate income tax rate scheme as one 
means of addressing the inequities of the concentration of wealth, 
Roosevelt went on to revive the tax on intercorporate dividends that 
had been defeated in 1934. He contended that it would serve as an 
anti-abuse measure for the graduated rates:  
Provision should, of course, be made to prevent evasion of such 
graduated tax on corporate incomes through the device of numer-
ous subsidiaries or affiliates, each of which might technically qual-
ify as a small concern even though all were in fact operated as a 
single organization. The most effective method of preventing such 
evasions would be a tax on dividends received by corporations.88 
 Business groups swiftly responded to the President’s tax message 
and the proposals for reforming corporate taxation. In a report issued 
one month later, the Committee on Federal Finance of the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce concluded, “The purpose of the proposed taxes 
is obviously to break up large organizations and to compel business 
knowledge of the practical use and operation of the consolidated return, this form of ac-
counting has been erroneously associated with the freely denounced holding company or 
condemned as a device for the promotion of top-heavy capitalizations.”). 
 86. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress on Tax Revision, AM. PRESIDENCY 
PROJECT (June 19, 1935), http:www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15088. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
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to conduct its activities by means of relatively small units.”89 Similar-
ly, the National Industrial Conference Board observed that “[t]he 
Administration desires a program of taxation, the effect of which is 
primarily to tax or penalize size or bigness, wherever and in whatev-
er form it may be found.”90 
 During the hearings over the ensuing bill, businesses assailed any 
notion that the intercorporate dividends tax could be defended as a 
revenue or anti-abuse provision. Fred Clausen, Chairman of the 
Committee on Federal Finance for the United States Chamber of 
Commerce, pointed out that the maximum the proposed tax could 
possibly hope to raise at the 85% exemption rate would be $39.7 mil-
lion, but even that assumed all dividends were taxed regardless of 
whether the corporation receiving it had any net income aside from 
the dividend.91 At a 90% exemption, it effectively amounted to a 1.5% 
tax on dividends received.92 Ellsworth Alvord, also of the U.S. Cham-
ber of Commerce, added that “I do not know of anyone who admits 
that an intercompany dividend tax is sound. . . . [E]ven as a safe-
guard [against abuse of the graduated corporate tax rates] it is not 
necessary.”93 Alvord explained that “the hazards—the plain business 
financial hazards—of busting up a large corporation into a large 
number of subsidiaries far outweigh the gains which might be made 
by a saving in the graduated tax.”94 
 O.G. Saxon, a Professor of Business Administration at Yale, was 
also dubious of the anti-abuse rationale, testifying that “[t]he Presi-
dent’s objective of preventing evasion of the graduated tax could be 
obtained by requiring consolidated returns or some similar meth-
od.”95 Moreover, Saxon added that “[t]he proposal that dividends to 
corporations on shares of other corporations owned by them be taxed 
in order to avoid evasion through subsidiary or holding companies is 
so clearly discriminatory against investors in corporations and par-
ticularly in large corporations as to require little discussion.”96 Saxon 
predicted that “[i]t would have a deflationary effect on the stocks 
owned, for large-scale liquidation would likely ensue. Furthermore, 
 89. COMM. ON FED. FIN., CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE U.S., FEDERAL TAXATION: 
THE SUGGESTIONS IN THE PRESIDENT’S TAX MESSAGE 17 (1935).  
 90. NAT’L INDUS. CONFERENCE BD., THE NEW FEDERAL TAX PROPOSALS 29 (1935).  
 91. Proposed Taxation of Individual and Corporate Incomes, Inheritances and Gifts: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 74th Cong. 258-59 (1935) [hereinafter 
1935 House Hearings]. 
 92. MARK H. LEFF, THE LIMITS OF SYMBOLIC REFORM: THE NEW DEAL AND TAXATION, 
1933-1939, at 143 (1984). 
 93. Revenue Act of 1935: Hearing on H.R. 8974 Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 74th 
Cong. 339-40 (1935). 
 94. Id. at 340. 
 95. 1935 House Hearings, supra note 91, at 243. 
 96. Id. 
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there is no occasion for such a provision. The revenue yield would be 
comparatively small and there is adequate control today of stock 
ownership in competing corporations through the Clayton Act.”97 
 Given the weakness of the tax evasion rationale for the intercor-
porate dividends tax proposal, it is not surprising that Treasury offi-
cials paid mere lip service to it and instead focused on the role the 
non-taxation of intercorporate dividends played in contributing to the 
growth of corporate pyramids. Robert Jackson, Counsel for the Bu-
reau of Internal Revenue and a future Supreme Court Justice, noted 
that even outside of the economic and fairness concerns about pyram-
idal structures, “their effect on the revenue system is demoralizing 
and destructive of good administration.”98 According to Jackson:  
 Tax law has for some years encouraged and almost subsidized 
the growth of these systems. Stocks of our domestic corporations, 
when held by parent corporations, have had almost the same     
status as to the tax exempt privilege that the Government has giv-
en to its own securities. There was a distinct incentive to corpora-
tions to acquire investments in other corporations, and once ac-
quiring investments, there were, of course, the usual incentives to 
acquire control.99 
 Jackson argued that taxing intercorporate dividends would aid in 
the assault against corporate pyramids that had already begun with 
the withdrawal of the consolidated return privilege. He indicated 
that it “would be desirable as a means of encouraging the simplifica-
tion of corporate structures. Intercorporate dividends are largely un-
necessary transfers brought about and multiplied by complex corpo-
rate structures.”100 Jackson explicitly situated the intercorporate div-
idends tax in the broader campaign against corporate pyramids that 
started with the repeal of consolidated returns for most companies:  
Up until last year the Federal Government had done little or noth-
ing to discourage such needless complexities. Last year a definite 
step was taken in this direction by the abolition of consolidated re-
turns. The partial elimination of the exemption allowed intercor-
porate dividends would be a further step in this direction and 
would have the effect of discouraging the multiplication of inter-
mediate holding companies and of encouraging the creation and 
maintenance of straight-forward capital structures that can be un-
derstood by the average investor and public official.101 
 97. Id. 
 98. ROBERT H. JACKSON, TREASURY DEP’T, MEMORANDUM AS TO GRADUATED CORPO-
RATION INCOME TAX AND INTERCORPORATE DIVIDEND TAX 30 (1935), available at 
http://archive.org/stream/memorandumastogr00jack#page/n5/mode/2up. 
 99. Id. at 33. 
 100. Id. at 34. 
 101. Id. at 35. 
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 Even the revenue estimates looked better when the intercorporate 
dividends tax was viewed as an attack on multitiered corporate 
structures. In the context of a corporate pyramid, for instance, the 
effective rate might rise if a multitiered corporation actually distrib-
uted a dividend up several steps in the chain. According to one esti-
mate, “the tax on intercorporate dividends would vary from 1½ per 
cent to 2⅝ per cent, if the tax applied to 15 per cent of such divi-
dends. . . . In the case of pyramided complex holding companies, such 
taxes might amount to 8 or 10 per cent.”102 In specific cases, the tax 
burden of the intercorporate dividends tax on corporate pyramids 
might be even higher: 
In the case of one large public utility holding company with many 
subsidiaries, which the Treasury took for illustrative purposes, it 
was estimated that this tax would have amounted to 12 cents per 
share in 1930; in the case of a certain large industrial company 
with many subsidiaries, 5 cents a share in the same year.103 
 Not only was the intercorporate dividends tax consistent with the 
campaign against corporate pyramids, but it derived from a tax pro-
posal that had been explicitly considered during the debates earlier 
in 1935 over the Public Holding Company Act.104 In the House Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Representative Samuel 
Pettengill, a Democrat from Indiana, had proposed an explicit 2% tax 
on intercorporate dividends,105 which he explained during the House 
hearings over the Revenue Act of 1935 as the equivalent of an ex-
emption of 85% on dividends at a time when the corporate rate was 
13.75%.106 Pettengill later explained that he understood the Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce Committee lacked jurisdiction to con-
sider a tax, but “it was our way of getting it to the attention of the 
committee, with the thought of later bringing it to the attention of 
the Committee on Ways and Means.” 107  Economist Walter M.W. 
Splawn, special counsel to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce, had testified to that Committee that “[t]he most effective 
means of preventing pyramiding is to eliminate the so-called inter-
mediary companies interposed between the operating company      
and the company at the top. Heretofore these intermediary compa-
nies have, in effect, been subsidized by the Federal Government 
 102. Roy G. Blakey & Gladys C. Blakey, The Revenue Act of 1935, 25 AM. ECON. REV. 
673, 684 (1935). 
 103. Id. 
 104. At least one witness in the House Hearings for the tax bill makes reference to this. 
See 1935 House Hearings, supra note 91, at 327 (statement of Rep. Samuel B. Pettengill). 
 105. See Public Utility Holding Companies: Hearing on H.R. 5423 Before the H. Comm. 
on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 74th Cong. 2214 (1935). 
 106. 1935 House Hearings, supra note 91, at 329. 
 107. Id. at 328. 
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through exemption from taxes of dividends on their stock.”108 Splawn 
recommended that “[i]nstead of giving Government encouragement            
to intermediate holding companies through exemption from taxa-
tion, those companies should be required to pay taxes as though           
they were not tied in through stock ownership with a number of            
other corporations.”109   
 Months before Roosevelt delivered his 1935 tax message proposing 
the intercorporate dividends tax as a means of stemming evasion of 
the graduated rate scheme, he had endorsed an anti-holding compa-
ny proposal similar to Pettengill’s for taxing intercorporate divi-
dends. In January of 1935, Representative Sam Rayburn of Texas 
reportedly received White House support and approval for a proposed 
bill that would regulate and subject public utility holding companies 
to a penalty tax not unlike the one imposed on consolidated returns 
prior to 1934.110 The prediction was that “the tax finally decided on 
will be such as to permit holding companies which have not weak-
ened their structures through pyramiding to exist, while the public 
will be protected largely through the regulation, which will be of a 
character to prevent the rise of new holding companies.”111 Although 
the Public Utility Holding Company Act adopted later in 1935 substi-
tuted a total ban for the proposed tax penalty, the Administration 
remained committed to using taxes more generally as a check against 
corporate structures deemed to be abusive. Roosevelt merely made a 
strategic decision to subordinate the intercorporate dividends tax to 
the graduated corporate income tax rate proposal as part of an effort 
to simplify matters for the public by focusing primarily on the “un-
healthy and mischievous concentrations of wealth.”112 Nevertheless, 
the connection between intercorporate dividend taxation and the as-
sault on pyramids was already publicly established.   
 Moreover, there is evidence that Roosevelt was well aware of the 
connection between the intercorporate dividends tax and corporate 
pyramids when he made his proposal in 1935. In the President’s Sec-
retary’s notes, which contain documents that the White House con-
sidered important and confidential, there is a memorandum titled 
“Intercorporate Dividend Tax.”113 The memorandum, which may have 
come from Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, explained that 
 108. Id. at 328 (quoting Dr. Splawn in House Report 827, pt. 2, at 7). 
 109. Id.  
 110. White House Backs Holding Unit Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1935, at 25. 
 111. Id. 
 112. LEFF, supra note 92, at 136 (quoting a letter from Felix Frankfurter to Roosevelt). 
 113. Intercorporate Dividend Tax, in Franklin D. Roosevelt, Papers as President: The 
President’s Secretary’s File (PSF), 1933-1945, Box 186 – Taxes, at 5 (undated 1935) (on file 
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“[t]here has not yet been incorporated in the new tax bill the princi-
ple, originated in the tax legislation of last year, of taxing intercorpo-
rate dividends so as to discourage holding companies. . . . An 
amendment to effect this tax has been carefully drafted in the De-
partment of Justice and is ready for presentation to the Ways and 
Means Committee by [Robert] Jackson.”114 
 Business leaders assailed this use of the intercorporate dividends 
tax as part of the campaign against corporate pyramids that began 
with the repeal of consolidated returns. Fred Clausen of the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce noted that if the intercorporate dividends tax 
was aimed at breaking up holding companies, it was overinclusive in 
its application. As Clausen explained, “the proposal is not limited to 
taxing the dividends received by a corporation owning most of . . . the 
stock of another but applies to any holding of stock, no matter how 
small in percentage.”115 
 Business arguments apparently prevailed in the House, which ex-
cluded the President’s suggestion for an intercorporate dividends tax 
from its bill.116 The House did indicate a willingness to consider the 
measure in a separate bill aimed at “discouraging chains of holding 
companies,”117 however, suggesting that the majority wanted the pro-
posal to be stripped of its thin façade as a tax evasion measure and 
discussed in its true context. Nevertheless, the intercorporate divi-
dends tax was reinserted in the Senate bill in the form of an 85% div-
idends received deduction.118 In Conference proceedings, the House 
agreed to accept the principle of intercorporate dividends taxation as 
part of the tax bill, but it successfully reduced the amount of the div-
idend subject to tax from the 15% proposed in the Senate to 10%.119 
 The following year, the question of intercorporate dividends taxa-
tion was again on the agenda as part of the consideration of the Rev-
enue Act of 1936. Although much of Congressional attention was fo-
cused on a radical proposal to subject undistributed corporate profits 
to a penalty tax,120 the bill reported out by the Ways and Means 
Committee to the House contained a provision that would eliminate 
the dividends received deduction altogether.121 Ultimately, Congress 
 114. Id. 
 115. 1935 House Hearings, supra note 91, at 258. 
 116. Blakey & Blakey, supra note 102, at 685. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 22, at 381. 
 120. See Steven A. Bank, Corporate Managers, Agency Costs, and the Rise of Double 
Taxation, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 167, 170, 204 (2002). 
 121. Miller, supra note 54, at 303. 
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reduced the deduction from 90% to 85%, but it was changed from a 
deduction to a credit.122 
III.   EVOLUTION 
 Although the intercorporate dividends tax was not significant 
enough to actually disrupt corporate structures, it continued to loom 
large for both proponents and detractors in the years that followed. 
As Ellis Hawley observed, “the advocates of decentralization regard-
ed the act as an opening wedge. The small tax on intercorporate divi-
dends might someday evolve into a weapon that would eliminate use-
less and monopolistic holding companies.”123 This is precisely what 
worried opponents. A tax agent for Sears, Roebuck & Co. noted dur-
ing a discussion of the issue at the 1938 Annual Meeting of the Na-
tional Tax Association that  
[i]ntercorporate holdings will not be disposed of because of a tax of 
2½% on the intercorporate dividends, if the investment is profita-
ble. Therefore, in order to accomplish its stated purpose of forcing 
the discontinuance of intercorporate holdings, the government will 
be forced to increase the rates. It clearly follows that the trend      
of this kind of legislation leads directly to punitive measures,    
and regulation.124   
 As it turned out, this concern that the tax would continue to loom 
large was accurate, even if the prediction of increasing rates was not. 
In 1937, Robert Jackson declared that the tax had already succeeded 
in breaking up some holding companies, and he predicted that an in-
crease in the tax would finish the job.   
[T]he privilege of paying dividends profits free of tax from one cor-
poration to another, operated as a subsidy for the holding compa-
nies, one of the most favored forms of creating and operating mo-
nopoly. The recent repeal of this privilege and the substitution of 
an intercorporate dividend tax has already proved highly effective 
in dissolving holding companies, and undoubtedly an increase in 
that tax would prove an automatic discouragement of that particu-
lar type of antitrust violations.125 
Roosevelt joined Jackson in advocating an increase in the intercorpo-
rate dividend taxation as a means of addressing anticompetitive be-
havior. In his 1938 Message to Congress regarding the Temporary 
 122. Id.   
 123. ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY 350 (1966). 
 124. A.R. Kaiser, NATIONAL TAX ASS’N, Discussion of the Taxation of Intercorporate 
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National Economic Committee, Roosevelt noted that “[t]ax policies 
should be devised to give affirmative encouragement to competitive 
enterprise,” including “increasing the intercorporate dividend tax to 
discourage holding companies.”126  
 Opponents tried to limit the application of the tax, but to no avail. 
In 1937, for example, the Twentieth Century Fund’s Committee on 
Taxation proposed a version of the intercorporate dividends tax that 
was more narrowly tailored to discouraging corporate pyramids: 
The pyramiding of two or more holding companies is rarely neces-
sary for operating purposes, and it facilitates manipulation. Ac-
cordingly, the corporation income tax might distinguish between 
the first intercorporate payment of dividends, and the second and 
subsequent intercorporate payment of dividends. That is, divi-
dends paid to a holding company by the operating company would 
be exempt or taxed at a lower rate than dividends paid by one 
holding company to another. Such a tax would strongly discourage 
the pyramiding of holding companies and would discourage single 
holding companies only slightly—if at all.127 
This proposal, however, fell on deaf ears. In 1939, business lobbyists 
successfully targeted many aspects of the New Deal tax program for 
repeal or revision, but it fell short in securing a reduction in the tax 
on intercorporate dividends.128  
 The beginning of the end for intercorporate dividend taxation as a 
means of attacking corporate pyramids came when the ban on consol-
idated returns was eased in 1942 and a 2% penalty tax similar to the 
one in place between 1932 and 1934 was revived.129 Much like in 
1917, this came on the heels of the adoption of an excess profits tax 
with the accompanying concerns about the need for consolidated re-
turns to prevent profit shifting. Contemporary scholars had always 
viewed the ban on consolidated returns and the taxation of intercor-
porate dividends to be inextricably linked as policies against corpo-
rate pyramids. In 1940, Gerhard Colm, an economics professor and 
fiscal expert for the U.S. Department of Commerce, wrote that 
“[i]ntercorporate stockholdings have been used as a means for con-
trolling corporations without necessarily involving full financial re-
sponsibility for the controlled corporations. Consolidated balance 
 126. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
TRANSMITTING RECOMMENDATIONS RELATIVE TO THE STRENGTHENING AND ENFORCEMENT 
OF ANTI-TRUST LAWS, S. DOC. NO. 75-173, at 9 (3d Sess. 1938). 
 127. COMM. ON TAXATION OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, INC., FACING THE TAX 
PROBLEM: A SURVEY OF TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND A PROGRAM FOR THE FUTURE 
182 (1937). 
 128. LEFF, supra note 92, at 273. 
 129. See Maimone & Riley, supra note 4, at 782. Consolidated returns were actually 
permitted again starting with the Revenue Act of 1940, but only for purposes of the excess 
profits tax. Mundstock, supra note 4, at 10. 
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sheets and tax exemption for intercorporate dividends permit free 
use of this device.”130 As a consequence, even before the ban on con-
solidated returns was lifted, one practitioner pointed out that reviv-
ing the consolidated return would make the intercorporate dividend 
tax incoherent: “if provision for consolidated returns of affiliated cor-
porations should be restored to our taxation system, intercompany 
dividends within an affiliated group would be eliminated from tax 
consideration along with other intercompany transactions . . . .”131 
With consolidated returns once again permitted, this meant that in-
tercorporate dividends between corporations affiliated by 95% stock 
ownership were completely exempt (beyond the 2% tax for the privi-
lege of filing the return), while intercorporate dividends to stockhold-
ers owning less than 95% of the stock were only 85% exempt. 
 In 1964, the additional 2% penalty tax on consolidated returns 
was repealed, and consolidated returns once again became fully 
available.132 This was part of a broader program to aid small busi-
ness. Under the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, dividends 
received by small business investment companies were made 100% 
exempt.133 In his 1963 tax message, President John F. Kennedy an-
nounced a proposal to further advance this policy.134 Under the exist-
ing scheme, corporations were subject to a total rate of 52%, consist-
ing of a 30% normal rate and a 22% surtax rate on earnings in excess 
of $25,000. Kennedy proposed to “flip” the normal and surtax rate, so 
that the first $25,000 of taxable corporate earnings—“the entire earn-
ings of almost half a million small corporations” according to Kenne-
dy—would realize a 27% rate reduction, while total taxes applicable 
to larger corporations would not change.135 There was concern, how-
ever, that the benefit of the lower normal rate and the exemption 
from the higher surtax rate for the first $25,000 in income would not 
be confined to small businesses.136 Large corporations already took 
advantage of the $25,000 surtax exemption by spreading their in-
 130. Gerhard Colm, Conflicting Theories of Corporate Income Taxation, 7 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 281, 288 (1940). 
 131. Miller, supra note 54, at 304. 
 132. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 234(a), 78 Stat. 19, 113 (1964). 
 133. Emanuel S. Burstein, The Idiosyncratic Consequences of the Limits in Section 
246(b) on the Dividends Received Deduction, 13 TAX NOTES 1019, 1021 (1981). For more 
background on small business investment companies, see Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Why Is Small 
Business the Chief Business of Congress?, 43 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (2012). 
 134. John F. Kennedy, Special Message to the Congress on Tax Reduction and Reform, 
AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Jan. 24, 1963), http:www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15088. 
 135. Id. In 1964, he proposed that the surtax rate “be reduced to 28%, thereby lowering 
the combined corporate rate [from 52%] to 50%,” and in 1965, the surtax and total rate 
would be reduced further. Id. 
 136. See Sheldon S. Cohen, Election of Tax Free Intercorporate Dividends Under the 
Revenue Act of 1964, 6 WM. & MARY L. REV. 167, 169 (1965). 
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come among multiple subsidiaries. The flipping of the normal and 
surtax rates, with the result that the surtax rate was much higher, 
only increased the incentive for abuse. Kennedy therefore explained 
that “[s]ince the $25,000 surtax exemption and the new 22% normal 
rate are designed to stimulate small business, this reduction should 
be accompanied by action designed to eliminate the advantage of the 
multiple surtax exemptions now available to large enterprises oper-
ating through a chain of separately incorporated units.”137 He pro-
posed limiting affiliated corporate groups with 80% common control 
to one surtax exemption, which would effectively treat them as a sin-
gle entity.138 As enacted, multiple surtax exemptions were permitted, 
but at a cost of a 6% penalty, increasing the normal rate from 22% to 
28% in these instances.139 In return, the 2% penalty on consolidated 
returns was removed. As Kennedy explained, “if affiliated corpora-
tions are treated as an entity for the surtax exemption and other 
purposes, they should be permitted to obtain the advantages of filing 
consolidated returns without incurring the present tax of 2% on the 
net income of all corporations filing such returns.”140   
 Much like the shift in attitude toward the consolidated return, 
Congress shifted from taxing intercorporate dividends under an anti-
avoidance and anti-holding company rationale to permitting a more 
liberal dividends received deduction under an enterprise rationale, 
premised on the notion that the income was earned by a single enter-
prise.141 Thus, at the same time that the penalty tax was dropped 
from the consolidated return, Congress de-linked the 100% dividends 
received deduction from the filing of a consolidated return, making it 
an elective stand-alone provision.142 As enacted, the provision permit-
ted corporations to receive dividends tax-free from a member of the 
same affiliated group, which was defined to include an 80% owned 
subsidiary.143 In theory, this equalized the treatment of intercorpo-
 137. Kennedy, supra note 134. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 235(b), 78 Stat. 19, 125 (1964); Thomas 
D. Terry, Attorney, Internal Revenue Service, Panel Discussion on Certain Problem Areas 
Under the Revenue Act of 1964 at the William & Mary Annual Tax Conference 83-84 
(1964), available at http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1646 
&context=tax. For all affiliated groups but those with aggregate incomes close to $25,000, 
it was more advantageous to elect to incur the penalty in order to take multiple surtax 
exemptions. Charles L.B. Lowndes, The Revenue Act of 1964: A Critical Analysis, 1964 
DUKE L.J. 667, 678. 
 140. Kennedy, supra note 134. 
 141. See ANTONY TING, THE TAXATION OF CORPORATE GROUPS UNDER CONSOLIDATION 
71-72 (2013). There was some legislation designed to address abuse of the dividends re-
ceived deduction itself, but the focus on the perceived corporate governance abuse of the 
pyramidal structure had disappeared. See Mundstock, supra note 4, at 13-16. 
 142. See Mundstock, supra note 4, at 13-14. 
 143. Id.; Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 214(a), 78 Stat. 19, 52 (1964) (en-
                                                                                                                                        
2013]  WHEN WE TAXED THE PYRAMIDS 63 
 
rate dividends for separate filers and consolidated return filers. In 
practice, however, the price for making such an election for separate 
filers was high and roughly equivalent to, or higher than, the costs of 
filing a consolidated return itself.144 This led at least one contempo-
rary observer to predict that “[i]t provides for an election to claim the 
100% deduction, but the price in terms of disadvantages which must 
be accepted is so high that it is doubtful whether the provision will be 
used to any substantial extent.”145 Nevertheless, the move paved the 
way for the modern dividends received deduction that is scaled ac-
cording to size of ownership percentage. Corporations owning 80% or 
more of another corporation were eligible for the 100% dividends re-
ceived deduction, while corporations owning less than 80% of another 
corporation were eligible for the pre-1964 Act deduction of 85%.146 
 In the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the Omnibus Budget Reconcili-
ation Act of 1987, Congress put the finishing touches on the modern 
scheme. In 1986, the general intercorporate dividends received de-
duction was reduced from 85% to 80% for corporations that owned 
less than 80% of a subsidiary.147 As both the House Ways and Means 
and Senate Finance Committee reports to the 1986 Act explained, 
the rationale for this change was that it was necessitated by the 
broader changes in tax rates under the 1986 Act.148 Prior to 1986, the 
top corporate rate was 46%, and corporations eligible for the 85% div-
idends received deduction (i.e., those owning less than 80% of the 
shares of the subsidiary paying the dividend) were therefore subject 
to an effective rate of 6.9% (15% of the dividend subject to a 46% 
rate).149 In the 1986 Act, the top rate was lowered to 34%. If instead 
the dividends received deduction had been maintained at 85% under 
the new lower top corporate rate, the effective rate on intercorporate 
dividends would have fallen to 5.1%.150 The Staff of the Joint Com-
mittee on Taxation explained:  
Congress did not believe that the reduction in corporate tax rates 
generally should result in a significant reduction in this effective 
rate. Thus, the dividends received deduction has been reduced to 
acting I.R.C. § 243). 
 144. E. Randolph Dale, 1964 Act: Climate Improved for Multiple Corporations Despite 
Penalty Tax, 20 J. TAX’N 264, 266-67 (1964). The price included a limit of only one surtax 
exemption for the affiliated group, one accumulated earnings credit, and one $100,000 
estimated tax exemption. See id.; Cohen, supra note 136, at 179-80. 
 145. Dale, supra note 144, at 266. 
 146. See Burstein, supra note 133, at 1020-21. 
 147. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 611(a)(1), 100 Stat. 2085, 2249. 
 148. H.R. REP. NO. 99-426, at 244 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 HOUSE REPORT]; S. REP. NO. 
99-313, at 221 (2d Sess. 1985) [hereinafter 1985 SENATE REPORT]. 
 149. 1985 SENATE REPORT, supra note 148, at 221. 
 150. JAMES S. EUSTICE ET AL., THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986: ANALYSIS AND COMMEN-
TARY 2-64 (1987). 
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80 percent, resulting in a maximum rate of 6.8 percent on divi-
dends subject to the reduced top corporate rate (20 percent of the 
top corporate rate of 34 percent).151   
 In 1987, Congress completed the reform of intercorporate dividend 
taxation when it adopted a new 70% dividends received deduction for 
corporations receiving dividends from corporations in which they had 
less than a 20% stake.152 During consideration of the 1986 Act, the 
House had considered a bill that created three tiers: 100% for divi-
dends received from affiliates (i.e., 80% owned subsidiaries), 90% for 
dividends received from a small business investment company (down 
from 100% when the provision was enacted in 1958), and 80%, transi-
tioning to 70% after the phase-in period, for all other intercorporate 
dividends.153 In Conference, however, the Senate version was chosen.154   
 In the fall of 1987, the combination of the federal deficit concerns 
and the looming automatic budget cuts that would be triggered in the 
absence of new revenue led to a revival of interest in tax increases.155 
At first, President Ronald Reagan stood his ground “stumping the 
country saying he wants no tax increases.”156 The stock market crash 
in October, however, changed his tune.157 Declaring that “I’m putting 
everything on the table,” Reagan “abandoned his vow never to raise 
taxes and ordered his top aides to work with Congress in developing 
a deficit-reduction plan that ‘keeps spending and taxes as low as pos-
sible.’ ”158 Among the revenue raising proposals was to reduce the div-
idends received deduction from 80% to 75% for dividends from less 
than 20%-owned corporations. The House Ways and Means Commit-
tee justified the change under the enterprise rationale for the divi-
dends received deduction, explaining that it “believe[d] that the pre-
sent-law dividends received deduction is too generous for corpora-
tions that are not eligible to be treated as the alter ego of the distrib-
uting corporation because they do not have a sufficient ownership 
 151. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE 
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 274 (Comm. Print 1987). 
 152. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 
§ 10221(a)(1), 101 Stat. 1330, 1330-408. 
 153. 1985 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 148, at 244-45. 
 154. H.R. REP. NO. 99-841, at II-161 (1986) (Conf. Rep.). 
 155. Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Reagan Faces Deficit Showdown with Congress, Hard Choic-
es of Paring Military or Raising Taxes, WALL ST. J., July 16, 1987, at 56. 
 156. Id.; John H. Cushman, Jr., Fee Rise Suggested to Reduce Deficit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
28, 1987, at A1. 
 157. The Budget Deficit Disgrace, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1987, at A38. See generally DIV. 
OF MKT. REG., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKET BREAK xi (1988) 
(describing the volatility of the market in October 1987). 
 158. Jack Nelson, Reagan Backs Off His Stand Against Increase in Taxes: Aides Will 
Meet with Leaders of Congress on Debt, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1987, at 16. 
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interest in that corporation.”159 The Senate included no such reduc-
tion in the rate for intercorporate dividends, but in conference they 
agreed to adopt the House provision, with a reduction in the rate 
from 75% to 70%.160 
IV.   FUTURE 
 The reforms to the taxation of intercorporate dividends in the 
1960s and 1980s primarily reflect the move away from the anti-
holding company rationale of the New Deal and toward an approach 
influenced most prominently by a need for revenue. To the extent 
that the enterprise rationale continues to buttress the scheme, it does 
so in a blunt and largely unsatisfying fashion, with no differentiation 
in the percentage exclusion available for 79% corporate owners and 
20% corporate owners.   
 In 2007, the Department of Treasury’s Office of Tax Policy exam-
ined the dividends received deduction and found it particularly prob-
lematic because of the tax cascading effect.161 This is the problem of 
running income up through multiple tiers of corporate ownership, 
each of which is only eligible for a partial dividends received deduc-
tion. According to the Office of Tax Policy’s report:  
 By failing to allow a full 100-percent deduction for all intercor-
porate dividends, the tax system can impose multiple layers of tax 
on intercorporate dividends, which leads to distortions in the allo-
cation of investment by discouraging corporations from invest-
ments in other corporations that would be profitable in the absence 
of the cascading levels of taxes.162  
The Office of Tax Policy calculated that under the 70% dividends re-
ceived deduction, the additional layer of tax imposes an extra $6.83 
burden on every $100 of corporate earnings.163   
 The evidence the Office of Tax Policy marshaled regarding inter-
corporate dividends supports the notion that the partial dividends 
received deduction is not all that productive. Of almost $280 billion 
in intercorporate dividends issued in 2004, only $51 billion, or less 
than 19%, were subject to taxation—and that includes dividends not 
eligible for the dividends received deduction at all, such as dividends 
from foreign corporations.164 Of the nearly $100 billion in intercorpo-
 159. H.R. REP. NO. 100-391, pt. 2, at 1094 (1987). 
 160. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-495, at 965 (1987) (Conf. Rep.). 
 161. See OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, APPROACHES TO IMPROVE 
THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE U.S. BUSINESS TAX SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 76-77 
(2007). 
 162. Id. at 76. 
 163. Id. at 77. 
 164. Id. at 78. 
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rate dividends eligible for either the 100, 80, or 70% dividends re-
ceived deduction, only $16.8 billion in intercorporate dividends were 
eligible for the 80 and 70% deductions.165   
 There appear to be several alternative methods that have been 
proposed regarding the taxation of intercorporate dividends. One 
possibility is to provide a 100% dividends received deduction for all 
intercorporate dividends. This was the system in place prior to 1935. 
In 1979, the American Bar Association’s Committee on Affiliated and 
Related Corporations proposed returning to this approach, noting 
that the original purpose of the move away from a 100% deduction 
“was twofold: (1) to prevent the use of graduated corporate income 
tax rates by members of a single corporate group, that is, to prevent 
the use of multiple surtax allowances; and (2) to discourage the use of 
elaborate chains of public utility holding companies.”166 The Commit-
tee explained, “[i]t is highly doubtful whether the slight reduction in 
the dividends-received deduction from 100 percent to 85 percent 
achieved either purpose.”167 Moreover, at least in the case of the lat-
ter explanation, the culmination of the successful battle to eliminate 
public utility holding companies, which coincided with the repeal of 
the ban on consolidated returns, effectively shifted the focus away 
from anti-bigness.168 
 With respect to the concern that an unlimited dividends received 
deduction would be abused, several provisions have been enacted 
that target such abuse more effectively than the declining dividends 
received deduction percentage. In 1969, Congress moved to shut 
down one problem with affiliated groups of corporations in a gradu-
ated corporate rate scheme—the multiple surtax exemption.169 The 
Revenue Act of 1964 had taken some steps against this practice by 
imposing a penalty tax for the privilege of claiming multiple surtax 
exemptions,170 but in the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Congress shut it 
down altogether by limiting controlled corporations to one surtax ex-
 165. Id. 
 166. Comm. on Affiliated & Related Corps., Summaries of Proposed Legislative Rec-
ommendations to Amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to Apply a 100 Percent Divi-
dends-Received Deduction to All Dividends Received by a Corporation from a Domestic Cor-
poration, 32 TAX LAW. 863, 864 (1979). 
 167. Id. 
 168. See Steven A. Bank, Taxing Bigness, 66 TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manu-
script at 36-37) (on file with author). But see Randall Morck, How to Eliminate Pyramidal 
Business Groups: The Double Taxation of Intercorporate Dividends and Other Incisive Uses 
of Tax Policy, 19 TAX POL’Y & THE ECON. 135, 169 (2005) (suggesting the taxation of inter-
corporate dividends might be used in other countries to combat the corporate governance 
problems of pyramidal structures). 
 169. Thomas R. White III, The Tax Reform Act of 1969: Demise of Multiple Surtax Ex-
emptions—When Too Much of a Good Thing Proved Its Own Undoing, 16 WAYNE L. REV. 
1353, 1358-60 (1970). 
 170. See supra text accompanying notes 136-39. 
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emption.171 Of course, this type of abuse is driven primarily by the 
existence of graduated corporate rates that reward the splitting of 
income among multiple subsidiaries so none of them have incomes 
beyond the lowest rate. 172  Repealing the graduated rate scheme 
would reduce the tax incentives for utilizing such a structure.173 
 In the 1980s, Congress further strengthened protections against 
several other schemes designed to abuse the dividends received de-
duction, such as extraordinary dividends on stock held for less than 
two years.174 These schemes were called “milking transactions” be-
cause the goal is to milk the profits of the subsidiary in a tax-free in-
tercorporate dividend.175 Congress also limited the ability of corporate 
parents to extract tax-free intercorporate dividends through debt-
financed subsidiary portfolio stock purchases.176 These transactions 
were concerning because the combination of an interest deduction 
and the dividends received deduction appeared to permit the corpora-
tion to shelter unrelated income or to subsidize a takeover.177 
 A second possible reform that has been proposed as an alternative 
to the current scheme for taxing intercorporate dividends, which 
stands at the opposite end of the spectrum from the first, would elim-
inate the partial deduction altogether.178 The partial dividends re-
ceived deduction was always an awkward combination with the re-
peal of the consolidated return, since the rhetoric of an intercorporate 
dividends tax was, in reality, still a 90% and then 85% dividends re-
ceived deduction for corporations that were supposed to be considered 
separate in the absence of the consolidated return.   
 A version of this alternative was offered by Harvard professor Wil-
liam Andrews in his Reporter’s Study on Corporate Distributions for 
the American Law Institute’s Federal Income Tax Project on Sub-
chapter C.179 Andrews highlighted the difference between direct in-
vestments in controlled subsidiaries and portfolio investments in 
 171. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 401(a), 83 Stat. 487, 599-604. 
 172. See Michael Aikins, Note, Common Control and the Delineation of the Taxable 
Entity, 121 YALE L.J. 624, 651-52 (2011). 
 173. See Bank, supra note 168, at 44-45 (suggesting that other incentives, such as 
those targeted at small businesses, would remain). 
 174. See Mundstock, supra note 4, at 15-17. 
 175. Id. at 12. 
 176. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF 
THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, at 128-29 (Comm. 
Print 1984). 
 177. Id.  
 178. See, e.g., Maimone & Riley, supra note 4, at 778-79 (proposing a repeal of the par-
tial dividends received deduction for non-affiliated corporations, while retaining the 100%  
deduction for affiliated corporations). 
 179. See generally William D. Andrews, Reporter’s Study on Corporate Distributions, in 
AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: SUBCHAPTER C 487 (1982). 
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non-controlled corporations, suggesting that a full dividends received 
deduction made sense for the former type of investment, while there 
was no justification for a dividends received deduction for the latter 
type of investment.180 According to Andrews, the problem with allow-
ing even a partial dividends received deduction for portfolio invest-
ments is that it distorted investment decisions by preferring invest-
ments in corporate equity over other fully taxable forms of invest-
ment.181 By contrast, for a direct investment, “the dividend-received 
deduction is not enough to effect a consistent and uniform elimina-
tion of double corporate taxation.”182 Rather than setting the dividing 
line between these two investments at the 80% ownership percentage 
under the current rules, however, Andrew proposed a more compli-
cated scheme that would have allowed even a 10% ownership stake to 
be classified as a direct investment.183 The American Law Institute, 
however, never adopted the recommendations contained in his      
Reporter’s Study.184 
 There have been some proposals to tinker with the current partial 
dividends received deduction, but much like the 1987 reform they 
appear to be revenue-driven rather than based upon any conceptual 
notion of the proper tax treatment. In 2007, Charlie Rangel proposed 
reducing the 80% deduction to 70%, and reducing the 70% deduction 
to 60%.185 Much like in 1986 and 1987, this was part of a proposal to 
reduce the general corporate rate from 35% to 30.5%.186 In this case, 
however, the focus was not on maintaining the same effective tax 
rate, but on making the overall reduction in rate revenue-neutral. 
Nevertheless, this proposal has never been acted upon. Given the 
current push to reduce the corporate income tax rate in a manner 
that is either revenue-neutral or is part of a reform of business taxa-
tion that produces increased revenue,187 however, Rangel’s proposal 
or something similar may soon be revived by politicians seeking to 
pay for their own bills. 
 180. See id.   
 181. See id. at 494. 
 182. Id. at 496. 
 183. Id. at 490. Andrews classified an investment as “direct” if “(i) the investor corpora-
tion own[ed] more than 50 percent of the common stock of the issuer for . . . [at least] one 
year; or (ii) the investor corporation own[ed] 10 percent or more of the common stock of the 
issuer and designat[ed] the holding as a direct investment; or (iii) the investment ha[d] 
ever been a direct investment [for at least one year] and ha[d] not been subsequently com-
pletely terminated . . . .” Id. 
 184. Maimone & Riley, supra note 4, at 790 n.46. 
 185. See H.R. 3970 Tax Reduction and Reform Act of 2007, COMMITTEE ON WAYS & 
MEANS (Oct. 29, 2007), http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/110/summary%20for% 
20distribution.pdf.  
 186. See id. 
 187. See Obama’s ‘Grand Bargain’ with Obama, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2013, at A12. 
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 A complicating factor in any proposal for reform of the dividends 
received deduction is the globalization of modern corporations.188 The 
basic rules limit the dividends received deduction to taxable domestic 
corporations. 189  There are exceptions, however, for dividends from 
foreign corporations arising out of earnings and profits accumulated 
while the corporation was still a domestic taxable corporation, and 
for dividends from a 10% owned foreign corporation with respect to 
the portion of the dividends that is U.S.-sourced.190 Some companies 
have invoked these exceptions in the context of so-called “sandwich” 
structures involving a domestic corporation owning a foreign corpora-
tion that owns a domestic corporation.191 Eventually, the Internal 
Revenue Service issued a private letter ruling to provide guidance for 
intercorporate dividends in this type of structure.192 More recently, 
however, the Service has had to issue additional guidance to disallow 
abusive uses of the dividends received deduction involving controlled 
foreign corporations.193 With reports suggesting that an increasing 
number of domestic companies are relocating outside the U.S. 
through reincorporation mergers, with either existing companies or 
shell companies,194 these types of structures may become more im-
portant. Indeed, if an anti-holding company sentiment prompts a 
move to a less generous scheme for taxing intercorporate dividends, 
it is likely that multinational holding companies will be the twenty-
first century version of the original corporate pyramids.     
 
 
  
 188. See Steven A. Bank, The Globalization of Corporate Tax Reform, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 
1307, 1308-09 (2013) (describing the growth of multinational corporations and the globali-
zation of corporate profits for domestic corporations). 
 189. See I.R.C. § 243(a). 
 190. See id. §§ 243(e), 245. 
 191. See, e.g., Hal Hicks et al., Sandwich Structures: The IRS Illuminates the Applica-
tion of the DRD and Other Provisions, INT’L TAX J., July-Aug. 2010, at 61, 61; John D. 
McDonald et al., The Dividends-Received Deduction and Sandwich Structures, TAXES, May 
2010, at 5, 5. 
 192. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200952031 (Dec. 24, 2009). 
 193. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. 201320014 (Jan. 18, 2013); see also Jasper L. Cum-
mings, Jr., The Substance of Dividends Received Deductions, 140 TAX NOTES 603 (2013); 
Jeffrey L. Rubinger & Nadia E. Kruler, Service Applies Substance Over Form Doctrine to 
Disallow Dividends-Received Deduction, 119 J. TAX’N 13 (2013). 
 194. See Mark Koba, Avoid U.S. Taxes by Forming a Merger Abroad, NBCNEWS.COM 
(July 31, 2013, 5:23 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/avoid-us-taxes-forming-
foreign-merger-6C10810789. 
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